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Abstract
Most tests of asset pricing models address only the pricing predictions —
perhaps because the portfolio choice predictions are obviously wrong. But
how can pricing theory be right if the portfolio choice theory on which it rests
is wrong? This paper suggests an answer: the assumptions about individual
preferences that underly common asset-pricing models are wrong, but the
deviations between the demands predicted by these models and the true
demands have mean zero in the population, and hence wash out in prices.
The starting point for this work is a set of experimental markets in which
risky and riskless assets are traded. This experimental setting oﬀers an op-
portunity to study asset pricing in an environment in which crucial variables
can be controlled or observed — in contrast to ﬁeld environments, in which
these variables cannot be controlled and frequently cannot be observed ac-
curately. The experimental data exhibit the same puzzling characteristics as
the historical data: asset prices are consistent with the price predictions of
familiar theories (for instance, the market portfolio is nearly mean-variance
eﬃcient) but portfolio choices are wildly divergent from the portfolio choice
predictions of the same theories (for instance, portfolio separation does not
obtain). To explain the data, we build a structural model based on pertur-
bations of individual demand functions (in the familiar style of much applied
work). The central feature of this model is that the perturbations (i.e.,
the diﬀerences between individual demands and the demands predicted by
mean-variance utility) have mean zero in the population. We develop an
econometric test of the model which tests both prices and portfolio choices,
and ﬁnd that the empirical distribution of the test statistic is consistent with
model predictions.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers C91, C92, D51, G11, G12
Keywords experimental ﬁnance, experimental asset markets, risk aversion1 Introduction
Most asset pricing models predict both asset prices and portfolio choices.
Forty years of econometric tests of such models present weak support for the
pricing predictions, but even casual empiricism suggests that the portfolio
choice predictions are badly wrong. Because the pricing predictions of these
models are built on the portfolio choice predictions, these studies oﬀer a
puzzle: How can the price predictions of asset pricing models be right if the
portfolio choice predictions of these same models are wrong?
In this paper we suggest a resolution to this puzzle. Our analysis has
three parts. The ﬁrst part presents data from experimental asset markets
— an environment in which asset payoﬀs and the information available to
investors can be controlled and prices and portfolio choices can be observed.
The price data from these experiments are consistent with the pricing predic-
tions of standard asset pricing models, including CAPM — in particular, the
market portfolio is mean-variance eﬃcient — but the portfolio choice data
are not consistent with the portfolio choice predictions of the same models —
in particular, investors do not hold the market portfolio. Indeed, the distance
from actual portfolio choices to theoretical predictions of portfolio choices is
uncorrelated with the distance from actual asset prices to theoretical pre-
dictions of asset prices. (These ﬁndings are perhaps all the more striking
because subjects are not informed of the holdings of others or of the mar-
ket portfolio, and hence cannot use standard asset-pricing models to predict
prices.) The second part presents a simple theoretical model that is capable
of explaining these data. Our model diﬀers from the standard CAPM in
assuming that demand functions of individual traders can be decomposed as
sums of mean-variance components and idiosyncratic components, and that
the idiosyncratic components are drawn from a distribution that has mean
zero. In a large market, the idiosyncratic components average out across the
population, and CAPM pricing prevails — but CAPM portfolio choice pre-
dictions do not. The third part takes this theory to the experimental data
using novel econometric tests based on a cross-sectional version of GMM,
and testing both prices and portfolio choices. We ﬁnd that the empirical
1distribution of the test statistic is consistent with model predictions.
In our experimental markets, ∼ 30 - 60 subjects trade riskless and risky
securities (whose dividends depend on the state of nature) and cash. Each
experiment is divided into 6-9 periods. At the beginning of each period,
subjects are endowed with a portfolio of securities and cash. During the pe-
riod, subjects trade through a continuous, web-based open-book system (a
form of double auction that keeps track of infra-marginal bids and oﬀers).
After a pre-speciﬁed time, trading halts, the state of nature is drawn, and
subjects are paid according to their terminal holdings. The entire situation
is repeated in each period but states are drawn independently at the end of
each period. Subjects know the dividend structure (the payoﬀ of each secu-
rity in each state of nature) and the probability that each state will occur,
and of course they know their own holdings and their own attitudes toward
wealth and risk. They also have access to the history of orders and trades.
Subjects do not know the number of participants in any given experiment,
nor the holdings of other participants, nor the market portfolio. We analyze
our data in the context of the static Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).1
To do so, we follow the standard strategy, familiar from empirical studies of
historical data, and use end-of-period prices and portfolio holdings, ignoring
intra-period prices.2 (Because our securities have only one-period lives, so
that we can use liquidating dividends as security payoﬀs, while empirical
tests of historical data usually take end-of-month prices as security payoﬀs,
our experiments actually represent an environment that is closer to a static
asset-pricing model than are typical ﬁeld studies.) Our experimental data
are consistent with the pricing predictions of CAPM: the market portfolio
is (approximately) mean-variance eﬃcient. On the other hand, our experi-
mental data are inconsistent with the portfolio choice predictions of CAPM:
individual investors do not hold the market portfolio. Indeed, individual
portfolio holdings seem almost random. And, as we have said, the distance
from actual portfolio choices to theoretical predictions of portfolio choices is
uncorrelated with the distance from actual prices to theoretical predictions
1Other standard asset pricing models would yield similar implications.
2This is not to say that intra-period prices are of no interest; see Asparouhova, Bossaerts
and Plott (2003) and Bossaerts and Plott (2004) for detailed discussions.
2of prices.
To explain these ﬁndings, we extend the standard CAPM to incorporate
unobserved heterogeneity; we call the extended model CAPM+. Our ap-
proach is similar to that used in much applied work: we assume that demand
functions of individual traders can be decomposed as sums of mean-variance
components and idiosyncratic components (perturbations), and that these id-
iosyncratic components are drawn from a distribution that has mean zero. If
these idiosyncratic components are independent and the population is large,
the Law of Large Numbers implies that the perturbations (approximately)
wash out in the aggregate. Hence CAPM+ predicts the same equilibrium
prices as does CAPM but is consistent with portfolio choices very diﬀerent
than those predicted by CAPM.
To test our model, we make use of the model assumption that individual
demand functions can be decomposed into mean-variance components and
idiosyncratic components and that the idiosyncratic components are drawn
from a distribution that has mean zero. These tests are novel in that they
link prices and portfolio choices, and also in other ways:
• In the usual models of choice with unobserved heterogeneity, the null
hypothesis is that the idiosyncratic components of demand have mean
zero and are orthogonal to prices. In our setting, however, it is the only
the idiosyncratic components of demand functions, rather than realized
demands that have mean zero. Because demands inﬂuence equilibrium
prices, realized (equilibrium) demands need not be orthogonal to prices.
This induces a signiﬁcant small-sample bias. Our tests accommodate
this bias, which means that our null hypothesis reﬂects a Pitman drift.
As a result, the asymptotic distribution of our GMM test statistic is
non-central χ2. (Absent the small-sample bias, the asymptotic distri-
bution would be central χ2.)
• To obtain a meaningful test, we need to estimate the unknown noncen-
trality parameter of the asymptotic distribution of our test statistic.
To do this, we use our multiple experiments to generate multiple sam-
ples. Because samples from diﬀerent periods within a single experiment
3are not independent, we construct empirical distribution functions us-
ing data across experiments rather than within experiments, and use
standard Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Cramer-von Mises statistics to test
whether the empirical distribution function could have been generated
by a member of the family of non-central χ2 distribution functions.
• To compute the weighting matrix for our GMM statistic, we need es-
timates of individual risk tolerances (inverses of risk aversion coeﬃ-
cients). Inspired by techniques introduced in McFadden (1989) and
Pakes and Pollard (1989), we obtain individual risk tolerances using
(unbiased) OLS estimation. Because the error averages out across sub-
jects, this strategy enables us to ignore the (fairly large) error in esti-
mating individual risk tolerances.
Following this Introduction, Section 2 describes our experimental asset
markets. Section 3 describes the data generated by our experiments, and
discusses the relationship of these data to the standard CAPM. Section 4
describes our expanded theoretical model and Section 5 describes the econo-
metric methodology and ﬁndings. (Technical details are relegated to Appen-
dices.) Section 6 concludes.
42 Experimental Design
In our experimental markets the objects of trade are assets (state-dependent
claims to wealth at the terminal time) N (Notes), A, B, and Cash. Notes are
riskless and can be held in positive or negative amounts (can be sold short);
assets A,B are risky and can only be held in non-negative amounts (cannot
be sold short). Cash can only be held on non-negative amounts.
Each experimental session of approximately 2-3 hours is divided into 6-9
periods, lasting 15-20 minutes. At the beginning of a period, each subject
(investor) is endowed with a portfolio of riskless and risky assets and Cash.
The endowments of risky assets and Cash are non-negative. Subjects are also
given loans, which must be repaid at the end of the period; we account for
these loans as negative endowments of Notes. During the period, the market
is open and assets may be traded for Cash. Trades are executed through an
electronic open book system (a continuous double auction). While the market
is open, no information about the state of nature is revealed, and no credits
are made to subject accounts. (In eﬀect, consumption takes place only at the
close of the market.) At the end of each period, the market closes, the state of
nature is drawn, payments on assets are made, and dividends are credited to
subject accounts. Accounting in these experiments is in a ﬁctitious currency
called francs, to be exchanged for dollars at the end of the experiment at a
pre-announced exchange rate. (In some experiments, subjects were also given
a bonus upon completion of the experiment.) Subjects whose cumulative
earnings at the end of a period are not suﬃcient to repay their loan are
bankrupt; subjects who are bankrupt for two consecutive trading periods are
barred from trading in future periods. In eﬀect, therefore, consumption in
a given period can be negative. (In the experiments considered here, the
bankruptcy rule was seldom triggered.)
Subjects know their own endowments, and are informed about asset pay-
oﬀs in each of 3 states of nature X,Y,Z, and of the objective probability
distribution over states of nature. In some experiments, states of nature for
each period were drawn independently from the uniform distribution. Ran-
domization was achieved by the use of a random number generator or by
5drawing balls from an urn, with drawn balls replaced. In the remaining ex-
periments states were not drawn independently. Rather, balls marked with
the state were drawn from an urn that initially contained 18 balls, 6 for each
state, and drawn balls were not replaced. In each treatment, subjects were
informed as to the procedure. Subjects are not informed of the endowments
of others, or of the market portfolio (the social endowment of all assets), or
the number of subjects, or whether these were the same from one period to
the next.
The information provided to subjects parallels the information available
to participants in stock markets such as the New York Stock Exchange
and the Paris Bourse. (Indeed, since payoﬀs and probabilities are explic-
itly known, information provided to subjects is perhaps more than in these
or other stock markets.) We were especially careful not to provide informa-
tion about the market portfolio, so that subjects could not easily deduce the
nature of aggregate risk — lest they attempt to use a standard model (such
as CAPM) to predict prices, rather than to take observed prices as given.
Keep in mind that neither general equilibrium theory nor asset pricing the-
ory require that participants have any more information than is provided
in these experiments. Indeed, much of the power of these theories comes
precisely from the fact that agents know — hence optimize with respect to
— only payoﬀs, probabilities, market prices and their own preferences and
endowments.
In the experiments reported here, there were three states of nature X,Y,Z.
The state-dependent payoﬀs of assets (in francs) are recorded in the following
table.
Table 1: Asset Payoﬀs
State X Y Z
A 170 370 150
B 160 190 250
N 100 100 100
1 unit of Cash is 1 franc in each state of nature. The remaining parame-
6ters for the various experiments are displayed in Table 2. Experiments are
identiﬁed by the year-month-day on which it was conducted. Note that the
social endowment (the market portfolio) and the distribution of endowments
diﬀer across experiments. Since equilibrium prices and choices depend on
the social endowment (the market portfolio) and on the distribution of en-
dowments, as well as on the preferences of investors, there is every reason
to expect equilibrium prices to diﬀer across experiments. Indeed, because
subject preferences may not be constant across periods (due to wealth ef-
fects, and possible eﬀects of bankruptcy or the fear of bankruptcy), there is
every reason to expect equilibrium prices to diﬀer across periods in a given
experiment. Note that, given the true probabilities, cov(A,B) < 0; as we
shall see later, this simpliﬁes the theory.
Subjects were given clear instructions, which included descriptions of
some portfolio strategies (but no suggestions as to which strategies to choose).3
Most of the subjects in these experiments had some knowledge about eco-
nomics in general and about ﬁnancial economics in particular: Caltech un-
dergraduates had taken a course in introductory ﬁnance, Claremont and Oc-
cidental undergraduates were taking economics and/or econometrics classes,
and MBA students are exposed to various courses in ﬁnance. In the experi-
ment 011126, for which the subjects were undergraduates at the University
of Soﬁa (Bulgaria), subjects may have been less knowledgeable.
3Complete instructions and other details are available at
http//eeps3.caltech.edu/market-011126; use anonymous login, ID 1, password a.
7Table 2: Experimental Parameters
Date Draw Subject Bonus Endowments Cash Exchange
Type a Category Reward A B Notesb Rate
(Number) (franc) (franc) $/franc
981007 I 30 0 4 4 -19 400 0.03
981116 I 23 0 5 4 -20 400 0.03
21 0 2 7 -20 400 0.03
990211 I 8 0 5 4 -20 400 0.03
11 0 2 7 -20 400 0.03
990407 I 22 175 9 1 -25 400 0.03
22 175 1 9 -24 400 0.04
991110 I 33 175 5 4 -22 400 0.04
30 175 2 8 -23.1 400 0.04
991111 I 22 175 5 4 -22 400 0.04
23 175 2 8 -23.1 400 0.04
011114 D 21 125 5 4 -22 400 0.04
12 125 2 8 -23.1 400 0.04
011126 D 18 125 5 4 -22 400 0.04
18 125 2 8 -23.1 400 0.04
011205 D 17 125 5 4 -22 400 0.04
17 125 2 8 -23.1 400 0.04
aI: states are drawn independently across periods; D: states are drawn without replacement, starting
from a population of 18 balls, six of each type (state).
bAs discussed in the text, endowment of Notes includes loans to be repaid at the end of the period.
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In this Section, we summarize the data from our experimental markets, using
a simple model to help organize it.
In our experiments, we observe and record every transaction. However,
we focus here only on the ends of periods: that is, on the prices of the
last transaction in each period and on individual holdings at the end of
each period.4 Our focus on end-of-period prices and holdings is parallel to
that of most empirical studies of historical data, which typically consider
only beginning-of-month and end-of-month prices, and ignore prices at all
intermediate dates.5 In historical data, there is uncertainty at the beginning
of each month about what prices — used as proxies for payoﬀs — will be
at the end of each month. In our experiments, there is uncertainty at the
end of each period about what state will be drawn and hence about what
payoﬀs will be. (It is important to keep in mind that, although trading in
our experimental markets occurs throughout each period, no information is
revealed during that time; information is only revealed after trading ends,
when the state of nature is drawn.)
Given our focus on end-of-period prices and holdings, it is appropriate to
organize the data using a static model of asset trading, as in Arrow and Hahn
(1971) or Radner (1972): investors trade assets before the state of nature is
known; assets yield dividends and consumption takes place after the state
of nature is revealed. (Because there is only one good, there is no trade in
commodities, hence no trade after the state of nature is revealed.)
4A complete record of every transaction in every experiment is available at:
http://www.hss.caltech.edu/∼pbs/BPZdata. Because the end of the period is in some
ways a bit arbitrary, other possibilities might have been equally sensible. For example, we
might have chosen instead to focus on averages over the last 10 seconds of each period.
5The historical record provides little information about holdings.
93.1 CAPM
In our experiments, two risky assets and a riskless asset (Notes) are traded
against Cash. However, Cash and Notes have the same payoﬀs. Simplifying
slightly, we therefore treat Cash and Notes as perfect substitutes, hence re-
dundant assets, and use a model with two risky assets and one riskless asset.
(If Cash and Notes were exact perfect substitutes, then the price of Notes
would be exactly 100 at the end of each trading period. As Table 3 shows,
this is approximately the case in most periods in most experiments. That
the price of Notes is not exactly 100 at the end of every period reﬂects the
fact that all transactions must take place through Cash, so that there is a
transaction value of Cash.)
In our model, investors trade assets A,B,N, which are claims to state-
dependent consumption. In our experiments, there are 3 states of nature
X,Y,Z. We write divA for the state-dependent dividends of asset A, divA(s)
for dividends in state s, and so forth. If θ = (θA,θB,θN) ∈ IR
3 is a portfolio
of assets, we write
divθ = θA(divA) + θB(divB) + θN(divN)
for the state-dependent dividends on the portfolio θ.
There are I investors. Investor i is characterized by an endowment port-





+ ×IR of risky and riskless assets, and a strictly
concave, strictly monotone utility function Ui : IR
3 → IR deﬁned over state-
dependent terminal consumptions. (To be consistent with our experimental
design, we allow consumption to be negative.) Endowments and holdings of
risky assets are constrained to be non-negative, but endowments and hold-
ings of the riskless asset can be negative. In particular, risky assets cannot
be sold short, but the riskless asset can be. Investors care about portfolio
choices only through the consumption they yield, so given asset prices q,
investor i chooses a portfolio θi to maximize divθi subject to the budget
constraint q · θi ≤ q · ωi.
An equilibrium consists of asset prices q ∈ IR
3
++ and portfolio choices
θi ∈ IR
2
+ × IR for each investor such that
10• choices are budget feasible: for each i
q · θ
i ≤ q · ω
i






i) ⇒ q · ϕ > q · ω
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Because the stakes in our experiments are small (in comparison to current
wealth and even more so in comparison to present value of lifetime wealth), it
is natural to approximate true preferences of subjects by mean-variance pref-
erences. That is, we assume investor i’s utility function for state-dependent
wealth x is the form
U




where expectations and variances are computed with respect to the true
probabilities, and bi is absolute risk aversion.6 We assume throughout that
risk aversion is suﬃciently small that the utility functions Ui are strictly
monotone in the range of feasible consumptions (or at least observed con-
sumptions).
In our environment, mean-variance utilities imply the Capital Asset Pric-
ing Model (CAPM). We summarize the relevant implications of CAPM here;
see Appendix A for a more complete derivation. Write M =
P
ωi for the




B) for the market portfolio of
risky assets and M = M/I, m = m/I for the respective per capita portfolios.
6An alternative would be to assume individual preferences are of the state-independent
expected-utility family and use the quadratic approximation given by Taylor’s theorem.
At the scale of our experiment, the diﬀerences between the mean-variance approximation
and the quadratic approximation are almost unobservable; we prefer the mean-variance
approximation only for econometric convenience.







for the covariance matrix of risky assets. It is convenient to normalize so that
the price of the riskless asset is 1, so that (pA,pB,1) = (p,1) is the vector of
all asset prices. Abusing notation, write asset demands as functions of (p,1)
or as functions of p, as is convenient. Write Zi(p) for investor i’s demand
for all assets at prices p, and zi(p) for investor i’s demand for risky assets at
prices p.
CAPM equilibrium prices ˜ p for risky assets and equilibrium demands are
given by the formulas:





























is frequently called the market risk tolerance.) Because the de-
mand and pricing formulas involve individual risk aversions, which are not
directly observable, they are not testable. However, the following immediate
consequences of these formulas are testable.
• Mean-Variance Eﬃciency The market portfolio m of risky assets is
mean-variance eﬃcient; that is, the expected excess return E(divm)−
q ·m on the portfolio m is highest among all portfolios having variance
no greater than var(divm).7
• Portfolio Separation All investors hold a portfolio of risky assets
that is a non-negative multiple of the market portfolio m of risky assets.
7Because M,m diﬀer only by riskless assets, the entire market portfolio M is also
mean-variance eﬃcient.
12All of the predictions derived above depend on the assumption that in-
vestors are strictly risk averse: bi > 0. It is not obvious that subjects will
display strict risk aversion in a laboratory setting. However, this is ultimately
an empirical question, not a theoretical one. Our data suggest strongly in-
consistent that individuals are risk averse. This is not a new ﬁnding; see Holt
and Laury (2002) for instance.
3.2 Prices and Holdings
Table 3 summarizes end-of-period prices in all of our experiments. Note that
prices are below expected returns in the vast majority of cases; this provides
evidence that subjects are indeed strictly risk averse.
To compare observed prices with the predictions of CAPM we need a con-
venient measure of the deviation of the market portfolio from mean-variance
eﬃciency; Sharpe ratios provide such a convenient measure. Recall that,
given asset prices q, the rate of return on a portfolio θ is E[div θ/q · θ], and
the excess rate of return is the diﬀerence between the return on θ and the
return on the riskless asset. In our context, the rate of return on the riskless
asset is 1, so the excess rate of return on the portfolio θ is E[div θ/q ·θ]−1.
The Sharpe ratio of θ is the ratio of its excess return to its volatility:
ShR(θ) =
E[divθ/q · θ] − 1
q
var(divθ/q · θ)
The market portfolio is mean variance eﬃcient if and only if the market
portfolio has the largest Sharpe Ratio among all portfolios, so the diﬀerence





is a measure of the deviation of the market portfolio from mean-variance
eﬃciency. Figure 1 summarizes these deviations in all our experiments.
Because a typical experiment involves more than 30 subjects, displaying
portfolio holdings of each subject in each experiment is impractical and un-
13Table 3: End-Of-Period Transaction Prices
Date Seca Period
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
981007 A 220/230b 216/230 215/230 218/230 208/230 205/230
B 194/200 197/200 192/200 192/200 193/200 195/200
Nc 95d 98 99 97 99 99
981116 A 215e 203 210 211 185 201
B 187 194 195 193 190 185
N 99 100 98 100 100 99
990211 A 219 230 220 201 219 230 240
B 190 183 187 175 190 180 200
N 96 95 95 98 96 99 97
990407 A 224 210 205 200 201 213 201 208
B 195 198 203 209 215 200 204 220
N 99 99 100 99 99 99 99 99
991110 A 203 212 214 214 210 204
B 166 172 180 190 192 189
N 96 97 97 99 98 101
991111 A 225 217 225 224 230 233 215 209
B 196 200 181 184 187 188 188 190
N 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
011114 A 230/230 207/225 200/215 210/219 223/223 226/228 233/234 246/242 209/228
B 189/200 197/203 197/204 200/207 189/204 203/208 211/212 198/208 203/210
N 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 98 99
011126 A 180/230 175/222 195/226 183/217 200/220 189/225 177/213 190/219
B 144/200 190/201 178/198 178/198 190/201 184/197 188/198 175/193
N 93 110 99 100 98 99 102 99
011205 A 213/230 212/235 228/240 205/231 207/237 232/242 242/248 255/257 229/246
B 195/200 180/197 177/194 180/194 172/190 180/192 190/195 185/190 185/190
N 99 100 99 99 99 99 99 99 100
aSecurity.
bEnd-of-period transaction price/expected payoﬀ.
cNotes.
dFor Notes, end-of-period transaction prices only are displayed. Payoﬀ equals 100.
eEnd-of-period transaction prices only are displayed. Expected payoﬀs are as in 981007. Same for




































Figure 1: Plot of distance from CAPM pricing (measured as diﬀerence be-
tween the maximum Sharpe ratio and the Sharpe ratio of the market port-
folio) in all periods of all experiments
15informative. Instead, we focus on the average deviation between actual hold-
ings of risky assets and the holdings of risky assets predicted by CAPM. Port-
folio Separation predicts that each investor’s holding of risky assets should be
a non-negative multiple of the market portfolio of risky assets; equivalently,
that the ratio of the value of investor i’s holding of asset A to the value of
investor i’s holding of all risky assets should be the same as the ratio of the
value of the market holding of asset A to the value of the market portfolio
of all risky assets. A measure of the extent to which the data deviates from

















Figure 2 displays mean absolute diﬀerences for each period in each experi-
ment. As the reader can see, Portfolio Separation fails quite substantially.
Indeed, the average deviations are roughly as large as they would be if in-
vestors chose portfolio weightings at random.8
As Figures 1 and 2 show, Mean Variance Eﬃciency seems conﬁrmed in
the experimental data while Portfolio Separation does not. An even more
striking fact which is diﬃcult to see in these tables, can be seen quite clearly
in Figure 3. Each point (small circle) in Figure 3 represents a single period of
a single experiment. The horizontal component of each point is the deviation
(at the end-of-period prices) of the market portfolio from mean-variance eﬃ-
ciency; the vertical component of each point is the mean absolute deviation
from portfolio separation. As can be seem very clearly in Figure 3, there is
no correlation between the deviation from mean variance eﬃciency and the
deviation from portfolio separation.
8To make the point simply, suppose all investors hold the same risky wealth but choose
the weighting on asset A at random. The population mean of weighting on asset A must
then equal the market weighting on asset A, which is approximately .4 in many of our








where λE denotes the restriction of Lebesgue measure to E ⊂ [0,1]. If this is the case




































Figure 2: Plot of deviation from Portfolio Separation (measured as mean ab-
solute diﬀerence between individual weighting on asset A and market weight-
ing on asset A) in all periods of all experiments


















































Figure 3: Plot of mean absolute deviations of subjects’ end-of-period hold-
ings from CAPM predictions against distances from CAPM pricing (absolute
diﬀerence between market Sharpe ratio and maximal Sharpe ratio, based on
last transaction prices), all periods in all experiments. There is no correla-
tion between distance from CAPM pricing (x-axis) and violations of portfolio
separation (y-axis).
184 CAPM+
In this Section we oﬀer a model that is capable of explaining the data we have
seen: it yields pricing predictions close to that of CAPM but is consistent
with very diﬀerent portfolio choices. Because the model diﬀers from CAPM
in that it adds perturbations (of demand functions), we refer to our model
as CAPM+.
Our starting point is suggested by the idea, familiar from applied work,
that parametric speciﬁcations of preferences represent only a convenient ap-
proximation of the observed (true) demand structure in the marketplace. We
implement this idea by viewing observed (true) demands as perturbations
of hypothetical demands. In principle, these perturbations might represent
some combination of subject errors (in computing and implementing optimal
choices), market frictions and unobserved heterogeneity of true preferences.
Because an adequate treatment of subject errors or market frictions would
necessitate a fully stochastic model, which we are not prepared to oﬀer, and
because we have some evidence that subject errors and market frictions are
not of most importance in our setting (see Bossaerts, Plott and Zame (2002)),
we focus here on unobserved heterogeneity.
Because the approach we follow is quite intuitive, the following informal
description is suﬃcient for our needs. Appendix B presents a careful and
rigorous justiﬁcation.
Consider an economy with I investors. Investor i has endowment portfolio
ωi and utility function Ui. Write zi(p) for i’s demand for risky assets at prices
p (which we assume to be single-valued). CAPM assumes that each Ui is
a mean-variance utility function. Whether this is the case or not, however,
we can always view Ui as a perturbation of a mean-variance utility function,
and hence can write the true demand function zi as a perturbation of a
mean-variance demand function ˜ zi:
z
i(p) = ˜ z
i(p) + 
i(p)
In this way, we can view the true economy as a perturbation of a hypothetical
economy in which the same number of investors have the same endowments
19but have mean-variance utilities. Write D, ˜ D as the mean market excess









































All this is simply formal manipulation. The economic content of our
model is in the following two assumptions:
i) The characteristics (asset endowments ωi and demand functions zi) of
investors in the economy are drawn independently from some distribu-
tion of characteristics.
ii) The perturbations εi are drawn independently from a distribution with
mean zero.
The ﬁrst of these assumptions is innocuous; the second has real bite. To
see the implications of these assumptions, note ﬁrst that, by deﬁnition, an




i is identically zero, then equilibrium prices in the true




i is uniformly small, then equilibrium prices in the
true economy and in the hypothetical economy nearly coincide. (This asser-
tion requires some justiﬁcation, which we provide in Appendix B.) Because
the perturbations are drawn independently from a distribution with mean
zero, a suitable version of the Strong Law of Large Numbers will guarantee
that if the number I of investors is suﬃciently large then, with high prob-
ability, the mean perturbation 1
I
P
i will be uniformly small. In view of
CAPM, the market portfolio of the hypothetical economy is mean-variance
eﬃcient at the equilibrium price ˜ p of the hypothetical economy. Because the
20market portfolio of the true economy is the same as the market portfolio of
the hypothetical economy we conclude that, if the number I of investors is
large then, with high probability, the market portfolio of the true economy
will be approximately mean-variance eﬃcient at the equilibrium prices of the
true economy. Of course, individual portfolio choices in the true economy
need bear no obvious relationship to individual portfolio choices in the hy-
pothetical economy; in particular, because the perturbations εi need not be
small, approximate portfolio separation need not hold in the true economy.
Perhaps the most important feature of this model is that provides a mech-
anism leading to mean-variance eﬃciency of the market portfolio even though
no single investor chooses a mean-variance optimal portfolio. (In the stan-
dard CAPM of course, the market portfolio is mean-variance optimal because
every investor chooses a mean-variance optimal portfolio.)
Because the pricing conclusions in our model are driven by the Strong
Law of Large Numbers, our model suggests that the likelihood that CAPM
pricing will be observed is increasing in the number of market participants.
Evidence for this suggestion can be found in Bossaerts and Plott (2002).
215 Structural Econometric Tests
In this Section, we construct a structural econometric test of CAPM+, and
then apply this test to the data from our experiments. Our approach has a
number of novel features that distinguish it from the usual approaches to the
econometric analysis of ﬁeld data:
• The usual approaches rely entirely on market prices. Our approach
links market prices and individual holdings.
• In the usual approaches, randomness is viewed as the sampling error in
estimation of the distribution of returns. In our approach, randomness
is viewed as the deviations of observed choices from hypothetical mean-
variance optimal choices.
• In the usual approach, GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) is
used to construct an estimator that has good properties for long time
series. In our approach GMM is adapted to construct an estimator
that has good properties for large cross sections. (We use this approach
because we do not have long time series: our experiments are only 6-9
periods long, and it is simply impractical to conduct signiﬁcantly longer
experiments. However, we can exploit the fact that each experiment
involves approximately 30-60 subjects, so that we have large cross-
sections.)
• The usual approach is to test a theory on each sample separately, and
then aggregate the results. Our approach is to construct samples as ag-
gregates of periods in diﬀerent experiments, use our theory to infer the
class of distribution to which our test statistic should belong, and use
measures of goodness-of-ﬁt to determine whether the empirical distri-
bution of our test statistic on these samples is generated by a member
of this class. (We use this approach because we lack information about
perturbation terms that would be necessary to uniquely identify the
asymptotic distribution of our test statistic, and hence cannot test our
theory on the data from a single period in a single experiment. Be-
cause outcomes across periods within an experimental session are not
22independent — each period involves the same collection of subjects,
and wealth eﬀects in early periods may inﬂuence attitudes toward risk
in later periods — our samples consist of outcomes in the same period
across the various sessions: one sample consists of outcomes from the
ﬁrst period in each experiment, etc.)
An additional novel feature of our approach is in our estimation of coeﬃ-
cients of risk aversion for each individual in each period. To obtain these
estimates, we use observed choices for that individual in other periods of the
same experimental session. Because the number of periods in each session
is small, our estimates cannot be accurate. However, we are able to use an
estimation procedure with the property that estimation error tends to cancel
out across subjects. This approach is reminiscent of one used to obtain con-
sistent standard errors in method of simulated moments with only a limited
number of simulations per observation; see McFadden (1989) and Pakes and
Pollard (1989).
5.1 The Null Hypothesis
We focus on an economy Et representing a single period t of a single experi-
ment, in which there are I subjects/investors. Investor i is characterized by
an endowment ωi and a demand function for risky assets zi
t; as in Section 4
and Appendix B, we view the characteristics of the subjects as drawn from
a population with a given distribution. As before, we write µ for the vector
of mean payoﬀs of the risky assets, ∆ for the covariance matrix of payoﬀs of
risky assets, and mI for the per capital market portfolio of risky securities.
The superscript makes explicit that mI may vary with the number of sub-
jects/investors I. This will facilitate econometric analysis: we are interested
in asymptotic properties of our test statistic as I → ∞. We subscript de-
mand functions zi
t to emphasize that they depend on the particular period;
we do not subscript the quantities ωi, µ, ∆, mI because they do not depend
on the particular period t. Because endowments are ﬁxed throughout the
experiment, we suppress them in what follows.
23For each i, let bi
t be the coeﬃcient of risk aversion that most closely
matches investor i’s end-of-period asset choices in other periods of the same
experiment, and let ˜ zi
t be the demand function for risky assets of investor
having the same endowment as trader i and a mean-variance utility function
with coeﬃcient of risk aversion bi
t. The diﬀerence between the true demand
function zi
t and the hypothetical demand function ˜ zi






t − ˜ z
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for the market risk aversion for the economy ˜ Et. (We use the superscript I
to emphasize that we have an economy with I investors.)
Assume that CAPM holds in the hypothetical economy ˜ Et and write ˜ pI
t for
the CAPM equilibrium prices (again, dependence on I is made explicit). At
equilibrium, per capita demand must equal the per capita market portfolio










−1(µ − ˜ p
I
t) (4)
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Assuming that end-of-period prices pI
t are actually equilibrium prices for the










Summing (4) and (5) over all investors i, combining with (6) and doing a
little algebra yields the following relationship:
p
I














24(Again, we use the superscript I to emphasize that we are considering an
economy with I investors. Note that prices pI
t appear on both sides of this
equation so it is not a formula for equilibrium prices.)
It might seem natural to proceed as is common in applied work and
take as null hypothesis the statement: The perturbations i
t are mutually






t] = 0. (8)
This null hypothesis would would lend itself readily to testing by means of the
Generalized Method of Moments statistic (GMM, or minimum χ2 statistic).
In our setting, however, this is the wrong null hypothesis: when I, the number
of investors in the economy, is ﬁnite, market clearing condition implies that
the perturbation terms cannot be independent of prices. Hence E[i
t|pI
t], the
mean of the perturbations conditional on prices, may be diﬀerent from zero
even though E[i
t] = 0, the unconditional mean of the perturbations, is zero.
(Of course, E[i
t|pI
t] → 0 as I → ∞ — perturbations have asymptotical
conditional mean 0 — but we have only a ﬁnite sample, and we must take
that into account.)
Instead, we take as null hypothesis that the conditional means of pertur-













Here we view the economy as a draw of I investors from a distribution of
investor characteristics. So the expectation is taken over all investors in
a particular draw, conditional on prices for that draw, and then over all
draws. Under Pitman drift, the asymptotic distribution of the usual GMM
statistic is non-central χ2 with non-centrality parameter λ2. Unfortunately,
λ is unknown. As a result, CAPM+ cannot be tested on a single sample (a
single period). However, CAPM+ can be tested based on the behavior of the
GMM statistic across samples (periods), because the form of its distribution
(non-central χ2) is known.

















We continue to use the superscript I to make explicit the dependence on
the size of the drawn economy. Keep in mind that hI
t(β) depends on the
particular draw, and therefore is a random variable. Now let βI be the













where W is a symmetric, positive deﬁnite weighting matrix (to be chosen
below). The depence of the solution on I is made explicit because we are
interested in its asymptotic distributional characteristics as I → ∞.
Under our null hypothesis, hI
t(β) is asymptotically zero in expectation
when β = BI































































t] → 0, as asserted.) The solution
of (11) therefore deﬁnes a GMM estimator of the market risk aversion: it
generates the value β which makes the sample version of the expectation
in (12) as close as possible to zero, the (asymptotic) theoretical value of this
expectation when β = BI
t.
Because there are two risky assets, random variation in ﬁnite samples
ensures that at βI the distance from zero of the sample version of (12) is al-
most surely strictly positive. Our criterion function [see (11)] will be strictly
positive in large samples as well, because the sample version of (12) is scaled
26by the factor
√
I. It has a well-deﬁned asymptotic distribution. With the
right choice of weighting matrix W, at its optimum βI, our criterion function
will be χ2 distributed with one degree of freedom (the number of risky as-
sets minus one) and with non-centrality parameter λ2. Hence, our criterion
function deﬁnes a GMM test of goodness-of-ﬁt.
5.3 Economic Interpretation of The GMM Test
It is illuminating to interpret the minimization that is part of the GMM
test in terms of portfolio optimization. Because the weighting matrix W is
required to be symmetric and positive deﬁnite, our GMM test veriﬁes whether




t in (10) is the
mean demand for risky securities; at equilibrium prices, equals the market
portfolio. Hence, if hI
t = 0, the ﬁrst-order conditions for mean-variance
optimality are satisﬁed.) In particular, the market portfolio will be optimal
for an agent with mean-variance preferences and risk aversion parameter β,
so our GMM test veriﬁes mean-variance optimality of the market portfolio.
Of course, verifying mean-variance optimality of the market portfolio is the
usual way of testing CAPM on ﬁeld data. In the usual ﬁeld tests, however,
distance from mean-variance eﬃciency is measured as a function of the error
in the estimation of the distribution of payoﬀs; here we measure distance as
a function of the weighting matrix W.

















(see equation (12)). W is proportional to the asymptotic covariance matrix
of the perturbations, so our GMM statistic measures distance from CAPM
pricing in terms of variances and covariances of the perturbations. Alloca-
tional dispersion is the source of errors, not randomness in the estimation of
return distributions. Our test thereby links prices to individual allocations,
and thus provides a more comprehensive test of equilibrium than ﬁeld tests
– which rely only on prices or returns.
275.3.1 Estimating The Weighting Matrix W
For the necessary asymptotic distributional properties to obtain, the weight-
ing matrix W should be estimated from the sample covariance matrix of
the perturbations across subjects. Perturbations depend on individual risk
tolerances 1/bi
t. Using an asymptotically (as I → ∞) unbiased estimator,
we obtain individual risk tolerances from portfolio choices across all peri-
ods in an experimental session except the period t on which the GMM test
is performed. From the estimated risk tolerances, we compute individual
perturbations for period t and, from those, we estimate W.
Since the number of periods in an experimental session (T) is small, the
error in estimating risk tolerances may be large. However, because we use an
asymptotically unbiased estimator of risk tolerances, the Law of Large Num-
bers implies that population means of the estimated risk tolerances converge
to true population means. Moreover, since risk tolerance in period t is esti-
mated from observations in periods other than t, the error in estimating an
individual risk tolerance and that individual’s perturbation for period t will
be orthogonal, provided individual perturbations are independent over time.
We write our estimator of W in such a way that we can exploit these two
properties and ensure concistency even for ﬁxed T. Appendix C discusses
our procedure in more detail.
5.3.2 Testing Strategy
The (asymptotic) distribution of the GMM statistic under the CAPM+ is
non-central χ2 with one degree of freedom (the number of risky assets minus
one), and with unknown non-centrality parameter. Our test builds on this
property. Speciﬁcally, we compute the GMM statistic for the 60+ periods
(samples) across our experiments. These outcomes are then used to construct
empirical distribution functions of the GMM statistic.
We cannot readily aggregate the results over all periods, because the
GMM statistics across periods within an experiment are not independent
(because of wealth eﬀects and because we estimate individual risk tolerances
28from choices in other periods, among other reasons). Fixing a period, how-
ever, the GMM statistics can safely be assumed to be independent across
experiments. (The subject populations of diﬀerent experiments are disjoint.)
Thus, we test whether the empirical distribution of GMM statistics is non-
central χ2 for a given period.
We use both the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic and the Cramer-Von Mises
statistic. The former uses the supremum of the deviations of the empirical
distribution function (of the GMM statistic) from a non-central χ2 distri-
bution function; the latter uses the density-weighted mean squares of these
deviations. We estimate the non-centrality parameter from all the data (all
periods in all experiments) in order to minimize estimation error. Eﬀectively,
the non-centrality parameter is estimated on the basis of a sample that is
at least seven times as large as the samples on which we test whether the
empirical distribution function of the GMM statistic is non-central χ2.9
There are two reasons why our test should be considered to be powerful.
i) We require the non-centrality parameter to be the same across periods
as well as across experimental sessions. Since distributional properties
of the individual perturbation terms ultimately determine the value
of the non-centrality parameter, this means that we implicitly assume
that these properties do not change across experiments. In other words,
we impose a strong homogeneity assumption across diﬀerent subject
populations.
ii) The non-centrality parameter imposes a tight relationship between the
moments of the GMM statistic. In particular, the diﬀerence between
its variance and its mean is equal to the (ﬁxed) number of degrees of
freedom plus three times the non-centrality parameter.
9An alternative approach would be to estimate the non-centrality parameter in-sample
and adjust p values accordingly. We have not done this because the correct adjustments
are not known.
295.4 Test Results
Table 4 reports Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) and Cramer-von Mises (CvM)
tests of whether the empirical distribution functions of our GMM statistics
for a ﬁxed period across experiments is non-central χ2 with the best-ﬁtting
non-centrality parameters (11.6 for for KS, 10.0 for CvM).10 All statistics are
corrected for small-sample biases as suggested in Shorack and Wellner (1986)
[p. 239]; p values are obtained from the same source.11
At the 1% level, both KS and CvM goodness-of-ﬁt tests reject only in
period 2; both tests fail to reject in other periods. At the 5% level, KS rejects
only in periods 1, 2, 5 while CvM rejects only in periods 1, 2; both fail to
reject in other periods. The data therefore appear to support CAPM+.
Lest the reader ﬁnd the p values in Table 4 smaller than one might hope,
it may be useful to keep in mind that the p values derived in econometric
tests of models on the basis of ﬁeld data are usually much smaller (despite
the fact that our tests are more stringent, in the sense that they test prices
and holdings). For example, in arguing that the performance of the three-
factor model is superior to other models, despite the fact that it is rejected
at the p = .005 signiﬁcance level, Davis, Fama and French (2000) [p. 450]
write : “[...] the three-factor model [...] is rejected by the [...] test. This
result shows that the three-factor model is just a model and thus an incom-
plete description of expected returns. What the remaining tests say is that
the model’s shortcomings are just not those predicted by the characteristics
model.”
Figure 4 depicts the empirical distribution of the logarithm of the GMM
10Best ﬁts are obtained as follows. Let FE(·) denote the empirical distribution function
of the GMM statistic. Let Fλ2(·) denote the χ2 distribution with one degree of freedom




11Since critical values for the Cramer-von Mises statistic are known only for speciﬁc p
values, we report the range in which a p value fall.
30Table 4: Tests Of CAPM+ Accommodating Correlation Between Prices And Per-
turbations
Period Number of KSa p valueb CvMc p valued
Numbere Observations
1 9 1.53 0.05 > p > 0.025 0.49 0.05 > p > 0.025
2 9 2.01 p < 0.01 0.91 p < 0.01
3 9 1.01 p > 0.15 0.21 p > 0.15
4 9 1.33 0.15 > p > 0.10 0.30 0.15 > p > 0.10
5 8 1.50 0.05 > p > 0.025 0.31 0.15 > p > 0.10
6 9 1.06 p > 0.15 0.39 0.10 > p > 0.05
7 6 0.96 p > 0.15 0.11 p > 0.15
8 4 1.26 0.10 > p > 0.05 0.42 0.10 > p > 0.05
aKolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic of the diﬀerence between the empirical distribution func-
tion of GMM statistics across experiments for a ﬁxed period and a non-central χ2 distribution with
non-centrality parameter 11.6. The KS statistic is modiﬁed for small sample bias. See Shorack
and Wellner (1986) [p. 239].
bBased on Table 1 on p. 239 of Shorack and Wellner (1986).
cCramer-von Mises (CvM) statistic of the diﬀerence between the empirical distribution function
of GMM statistics across experiments for a ﬁxed period and a non-central χ2 distribution with
non-centrality parameter 10.0. The CvM statistic is modiﬁed for small sample bias. See Shorack
and Wellner (1986) [p. 239].
dBased on Table 1 on p. 239 of Shorack and Wellner (1986).
ePeriod 9 is not listed because of insuﬃcient sample size.












Figure 4: Empirical distribution of the GMM statistic, all periods in all
experiments (jagged line), against a central χ2 distribution. A noncentral
χ2 distribution provides a better ﬁt, consistent with the small-sample biases
expected if CAPM+ is correct.
statistic across all periods in our experiments. For comparison, the smooth
line represents the distribution of the logarithm of a central χ2-distributed
random variable. The empirical distribution (jagged line) appears to be a
horizontal translation of the latter. This suggests that the GMM statistics
are drawn from a non-central χ2 distribution, which is conﬁrmed in Table 4.
To gain further perspective, Tables 5 and 6 show GMM statistics and
estimates of the harmonic mean risk aversion for all periods across all ex-
periments. (We show experiments where states were drawn independently
and experiments where states were drawn without replacement only because
32the combined table would be too large to display legibly on a single page.)
p-values are provided based on the central χ2 distribution (which ignores the
correlation between prices and perturbations inherent to CAPM+). Put
diﬀerently: p values in Table 5 are computed under the assumption that the
non-centrality parameter λ = 0.
Note that the estimates βI of the market mean risk aversion BI
t are of the
same order of magnitude across experiments, and are almost uniformly pos-
itive and signiﬁcant: risk neutrality is rejected. This conﬁrms our interpre-
tation of the relation of prices to expected payoﬀs as reﬂecting “signiﬁcant”
risk premia.
33Table 5: GMM Tests Of CAPM+ Ignoring Correlation Between Prices and
Perturbations — Experiments where Draws were Independent
Experiment Statistic Periods
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
981007 χ2
1 36.2 2.2 79.3 28.9 21.0 12.6
p level for λ = 0 .00 .14 .00 .00 .00 .00
βI (*10−3) 0.8 0.7 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.1
s.e. (*10−3 ) 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
981116 χ2
1 23.7 0.9 1.0 4.4 3.5 30.3
p level for λ = 0 .00 .35 .32 .04 .06 .00
βI (*10−3) 1.5 1.1 0.8 1.0 1.9 2.0
s.e. (*10−3 ) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
990211 χ2
1 5.3 11.2 5.5 33.3 4.0 15.4 0.2
p level for λ = 0 .02 .00 .02 .00 .04 .00 .69
βI (*10−3) 1.1 1.5 1.4 2.8 1.2 1.5 -0.2
s.e. (*10−3 ) 0.1 0.1 0.1 *a 0.1 0.1 0.1
990407 χ2
1 7.5 0.7 13.8 116.7 †b 2.5 13.6 †
p level for λ = 0 .01 .39 .00 .00 - .62 .00 -
βI (*10−3) 0.5 0.5 0.3 -0.3 2.8 0.3 0.2 0.9
s.e. (*10−3 ) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
991110 χ2
1 197.5 72.8 31.6 7.4 2.7 6.9
p level for λ = 0 .00 .00 .00 .01 .10 .01
βI (*10−3) 3.0 2.4 1.9 1.2 1.1 1.4
s.e. (*10−3 ) * 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
991111 χ2
1 4.8 1.5 114.4 61.4 36.3 43.4 31.6 30.8
p level for λ = 0 .03 .23 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
βI (*10−3) 0.4 0.3 1.7 1.4 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.3
s.e. (*10−3 ) 0.0 0.1 * 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
a* denotes that the weighting matrix was not positive deﬁnite, and hence, standard errors
could not be computed.
b† denotes negative χ2 because weighting matrix was not positive deﬁnite.
34Table 6: GMM Tests Of CAPM+ Ignoring Correlation Between Prices and
Perturbations — Experiments where Draws were without Replacement
Experiment Statistic Periods
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
011114 χ2
1 37.5 2.3 2.2 5.4 17.6 15.4 10.7 21.8 4.4
p level for λ = 0 .00 .13 .14 .02 .00 .00 .00 .00 .04
βI (*10−3) 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.4 0.5 0.1 1.1 1.3
s.e. (*10−3 ) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
011126 χ2
1 186.6 0.6 7.8 5.6 1.5 1.3 0.2 6.8
p level for λ = 0 .00 .44 .01 .02 .23 .25 .65 .01
βI (*10−3) 4.1 1.3 1.7 1.7 1.0 1.3 1.1 1.7
s.e. (*10−3 ) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
011205 χ2
1 2.9 10.4 17.4 13.8 13.0 15.3 7.8 19.0 5.0
p level for λ = 0 .09 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .02
βI (*10−3) 0.8 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.9 1.3 0.6 0.6 0.7
s.e. (*10−3 ) 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
356 Conclusion
This paper has argued that ﬁndings from experimental ﬁnancial markets pro-
vide signiﬁcant insight into asset-pricing theory. Speciﬁcally, these ﬁndings
demonstrate that deviations of observed individual demands from hypothet-
ical mean-variance demands are idiosyncratic, and hence have little eﬀect on
prices but may have an enormous eﬀect on portfolio holdings. These ﬁndings
suggest that it makes sense to test asset pricing models that rely on strong
portfolio separation results, such as CAPM and its multi-factor extensions,
even in the absence of convincing evidence for such portfolio separation.
As a by-product of our structural tests, we provide evidence that the stan-
dard model of choice under unobserved heterogeneity in applied economics
needs to be re-considered. In smaller markets, unexplained heterogeneity in
demands (usually a key determinant of the unexplained portion of observed
choices) need not be orthogonal to prices, and such non-orthogonality may
have signiﬁcant eﬀect on the econometric analysis.
The econometric procedure introduced here explicitly links prices to al-
locations, unlike in standard ﬁeld tests of asset pricing theory. With repre-
sentative data on portfolio choices, this procedure could be applied to ﬁeld
data as well.
36Appendix A: CAPM
To derive the conclusions of CAPM in our setting in which sort sales of
risky assets are not permitted, we begin by analyzing the setting in which
arbitrary short sales are permitted. Write b zi(p) for investor i’s demand for
risky assets when the price of risky assets is p. (We suppress demand for
the riskless asset because it is determined by budget balance.) Assuming, as
we do throughout, that consumptions are in the range where preferences are






−1(µ − p) (14)
At equilibrium, the demands for risky assets must clear the market for risky




i(b p) = m
From these equations we can solve for the unique equilibrium price b p:
b p = µ −















In our setting, short sales of risky assets are not permitted, and demand
functions are not given by the equation (14). However, we assert that the
model with short sales and the our model without short sales admit the same
equilibrium prices.
To see this, write zi(p) for investor i’s demand for risky assets when
prices are p and short sales of risky assets are not permitted. Note that
zi(p) = b zi(p) whenever b zi(p) ≥ 0: in particular, zi(b p) = b zi(b p); it follows
immediately that b p is an equilibrium price in the setting when short sales
of risky assets are not permitted. To see that there is no other equilibrium
price in this setting, suppose that p∗ 6= b p were such an equilibrium price.
If constrained demand zj(p∗) were strictly positive for some investor j, then
constrained demand zj(p∗) would coincide with unconstrained demand b zj(p∗)
37for investor j. However, formula (14) guarantees that if b zj(p∗) were positive
for some investor j then b zi(p∗) would be positive for every investor i, whence
zi(p∗) would coincide with b zi(p∗) for every investor i. Because p∗ 6= b p, this
would imply that p∗ was not an equilibrium price after all. It follows that
constrained demand zj(p∗) cannot be strictly positive for any investor j.
At equilibrium, asset markets clear; because the market portfolio is strictly
positive, it follows that some investor k chooses an equilibrium portfolio that
involves the risky asset A but not the risky asset B and some investor `
chooses an equilibrium portfolio that involves the risky asset B but not the
risky asset A:
zk
A(p∗) > 0 , zk
B(p∗) = 0
z`
A(p∗) = 0 , z`
B(p∗) > 0























Direct calculation using the explicit form of utility functions and making use























Our assumptions guarantee that bk,b`,var(A),var(B) are all strictly pos-
itive, and the particular structure of payoﬀs of the risky assets and state

























This is a contradiction, so we conclude that b p is the unique equilibrium price,
as asserted.
38Appendix B: CAPM+
In this Appendix we give a formal and rigorous presentation of the idea of the
true economy as draw from a distribution of individual characteristics and
as a perturbation of a mean-variance economy. Although the ideas are very
simple, and the conclusions both intuitive and expected, the details require
a little care.
We work throughout in the setting of Section 4, and retain the same
notation. In particular, two risky assets and one riskless asset are traded; the
risky assets cannot be sold short but the riskless asset can be; the covariance
of the risky assets is negative; consumption may be negative. We normalize
throughout so that the price of the riskless asset is 1; the vector of asset
prices is q = (p,1) ∈ R3
++. As before, we write µ for the vector of expected
returns on risky assets and ∆ for the covariance matrix of risky assets.
Distributions and Draws from a Distribution
We follow Hart, Hildenbrand and Kohlberg (1979) in describing economies as
distributions on the space of investor characteristics. The usual description
of an investor is in terms of an endowment bundle of commodities and pref-
erences over commodity bundles, but we ﬁnd it more convenient to adopt a
description in terms of an endowment portfolio of assets and a demand func-
tion for assets. We assume that endowments and prices, hence wealth, lie in
given compact sets End ⊂ IR
2
+ × IR, P ⊂ IR
3
++, [0,w] ⊂ IR+. An investor
is characterized by an endowment ω ∈ End of riskless and risky assets and
by a continuous demand function
Z : P × [0,w] → IR
2
+ × IR
for risky and riskless assets as a function of wealth w ∈ [0,w] ⊂ IR+ and
prices for risky assets p ∈ P ⊂ IR
2
++. (Recall that we have normalized so
that the price of the riskless asset is 1.) We assume throughout that the
value of demand is equal to the value of the endowment:
(p,1) · Z(p,(p,1) · ω) = (p,1) · ω ≤ [0,w]
39for each ω,p. (We could assume that demand satisﬁes properties that follow
from revealed preference, but there is no need to do so.) Write D for the space
of demand functions, and equip D with the topology of uniform convergence.
End × D is the space of investor characteristics.
We view a compactly supported probability measure τ on End × D as
the distribution of investor characteristics in a ﬁxed economy and also as the
distribution of characteristics of the pool from which economies are drawn.
Given an integer I, a particular draw of I investors from τ can be described







where δ(ωi,Zi) is point mass at the characteristic (ωi,Zi) ∈ suppτ ⊂ End×D.
We identify the set of such draws with (suppτ)I, which, by abuse of notation,
we view as a subset of M(E × D), the space of all compactly supported
probability measures on End×D. The I-fold product measure τI on (suppτ)I
is the distribution of all draws.
Equilibrium
Given a distribution η ∈ M(E × D), an equilibrium for η is a price p ∈ P
such that Z
Z(p,(p,1) · ω)dη =
Z
ωdη
(Because we describe investor characteristics in terms of demand functions,
we focus on prices and suppress consumptions. Of course, Z(p,(p,1) · ω) is
the equilibrium consumption of the investor with characteristics (ω,Z).)
We caution the reader that a distribution η need not admit an equilibrium,
and that convergence of distributions does not imply convergence of (sets of)
equilibria. However, as we shall show, the situation is much better for the
distributions of most interest to us.
40CAPM Distributions
Given an endowment ω, the portfolio θ is budget feasible if (p,1)·θ ≤ (p,1)·ω
for every p ∈ P. We say σ ∈ M(End × D) is a mean-variance distribution
if for each (ω,Z) ∈ suppσ there is a coeﬃcient of risk aversion b(ω,Z) > 0
such that the mean-variance utility function
U




is strictly monotone on the set of dividends of feasible portfolios and Z is the
(restriction of) the portfolio demand function derived from Ub(ω,Z). (Keep
in mind that we require holdings of risky assets to be non-negative.) Given
a mean-variance distribution σ we write Bσ =
R
b(ω,Z)−1dσ for the market
risk tolerance and mσ =
R
ωdσ for the per capita market portfolio. We say
the mean-variance distribution σ is a CAPM distribution if the price
pσ = µ − B
−1
σ ∆mσ
belongs to the interior intP of P. If σ is a CAPM distribution, it follows
as in Appendix A that σ admits pσ as the unique equilibrium price, that
the mean market portolio m is mean-variance eﬃcient at prices pσ and that
equilibrium holdings of risky assets z(pσ,(pσ,1)·ω) are non-negative multiples
of the mean market portfolio m (portfolio separation).
Mean Zero Perturbations
Write πE : E×D → E for the projection on the ﬁrst factor. If τ,σ ∈ M(E × D)
we say τ is a perturbation of σ if there is a measurable function f : suppτ → D
such that σ = (πE,f)∗τ; that is,
σ(B) = τ((πE,f)
−1(B)) = τ{(ω,Z) : (ω,f(ω,Z)) ∈ B}
for each Borel set B ⊂ E × D. We say τ is a mean zero perturbation of σ if
in addition Z






Evidently, if τ is a mean zero perturbation of σ, then τ and σ admit the same
equilibria — although neither may admit any equilibrium at all.
41Perturbations of CAPM Distributions
We are now in a position to state and prove the result we require.
Theorem Let σ be a CAPM distribution, and let τ be a mean-zero pertur-
bation of σ. For each ε0 > 0 there is an integer I0 and for every I > I0 there
is a subset ΓI ⊂ (suppτ)I such that
i) τI(ΓI) > 1 − ε0
ii) for every γ ∈ ΓI, the draw ˜ γ = F(γ) from σ admits a unique equilibrium
p˜ γ and the draw γ from τ admits at least one equilibrium
iii) if γ ∈ ΓI and pγ is any equilibrium of γ then kpγ − p˜ γk < ε0
Informally: if we draw a large enough sample from τ then, with high
probability the sample economy and the CAPM economy of which it is a
perturbation have nearly the same equilibrium price(s).
Proof If ν is a distribution, let Dν : P → IR
2









By deﬁnition, an equilibrium for ν is a zero of excess demand Dν − Mν.
By assumption, pσ ∈ intP. Choose ε1 < ε0 so that B(pσ,ε1) ⊂ P. Direct
computation shows that the excess demand function Dσ − Mσ is regular at
pσ. It follows that there is an ε2 > 0 such that if H : P → IR
2
+ × IR is any
continuous function and
kH − (Dσ − Mσ)kB(pσ,ε1) < ε2
42then H has at least one zero in B(pσ,ε1).
On the other hand, Dσ − Mσ is bounded away from 0 on P \ B(pσ,ε1),
so there is an ε3 > 0 such that if
kH − (Dσ − Mσ)kP\B(pσ,ε1) < ε3
then H is bounded away from 0 on P \B(pσ,ε1). Setting ε = min{ε1,ε2,ε3},
we conclude: if H : P → IR
2
+ × IR is any continuous function for which
kH − (Dσ − Mσ)kP < ε
then H has at least one zero on P, and all its zeroes belong to B(pσ,ε), and
hence to B(pσ,ε0).
For each I, set
G
1
I = {γ ∈ (suppτ)
I : kZγ − Zτk < ε/2}
H
1
I = {γ ∈ (suppτ)
I : kMγ − Mτk < ε/2}
G
2
I = {ζ ∈ (suppσ)
I : kZζ − Zτk < ε/2}
H
2
I = {ζ ∈ (suppσ)












Market demand is the expectation of individual demand, and the per capita
market portfolio is the expectation of individual endowment portfolios, so
applying the Strong Law of Large Numbers in the space of continuous func-
tions Φ : P → IR
3 (see Ledoux and Talagrand (1991) for the appropriate
Banach space version) and in IR
3 implies that there is an index I0 such that










I) > 1 −
ε
4
for i = 1,2.
Let f be the function given in the deﬁnition of mean zero perturbation,



























43so if I > I0 then τ(ΓI) > 1 − ε.
Finally, if γ ∈ GI then
k(Dγ − Mγ) − (Zγ − Mγ)k < ε
k(DF∗γ − MF∗γ) − (Zσ − Mσ)k < ε
Our construction guarantees that γ and F∗γ each admit at least one equi-
librium and that all these equilibria lie in B(pσ,ε0). Finally, because F∗γ is
a CAPM economy, it actually admits a unique equilibrium, so the proof is
complete.
44Appendix C: Estimation of W
We ﬁrst specify our estimator ΞI of W. After that, we provide an asymp-
totically unbiased and uncorrelated estimator of individual risk tolerances,
to be used in the formulation of W. Third, we prove that the error of this
estimator does not aﬀect the asymptotic properties of ΞI. As a result, we
substitute true risk tolerances for estimates of the risk tolerances in the for-
mula of ΞI, and we proceed to the fourth step, where we prove convergence
of ΞI to W.
In the sequel, we take the risk aversion coeﬃcients as ﬁxed. This is
consistent with the theory as long as perturbations are drawn independently
from risk aversion coeﬃcients. The econometrics conditions on risk aversion.
Likewise, we assume that individual perturbations are independent across
periods within an experimental session. In fact, all we need is that they are









t} → 0, (15)
all τ 6= t, as N → ∞.
The Estimator ΞI
To understand our estimator ΞI of W, let βi
t denote agent i’s risk tolerance,
i.e., βi
t = 1/bi




















































































































































































































































































































































































46which converges to zero, by the law of large numbers. As a result, the second-



























































which converges to zero, because E[i
t|pI
t] → 0.12 The same applies to the
last term in the above expression.
We shall make the same substitution for mI in the second and third term.





























































































Note that this expression does not involve unobservables – except for the risk
tolerances βi
t which we will discuss below.
This suggests the following estimator. Deﬁne the cross-sectional covari-

































































































In oder to implement ΞI, we need an estimator for the risk tolerances βi
t.
A judicious choice will allow us to obtain consistency of ΞI as only I (the
number of subjects) increases, keeping T (the number of periods in an ex-
perimental session) ﬁxed, and, if possible, small.
We obtain risk tolerances from OLS projections of holdings onto ∆−1(µ−
pI
t). We use end-of-period holdings for all periods except period t (the period
on which we run our GMM test). Let ˆ βi











where cov and var denote the sample covariance and variance, respectively,
over τ in 1,...,T with τ 6= t. Also, j = 1,...,J, with J denoting the number of
risky securities (length of the vector zi
τ). [y]j denotes the jth element of the












The estimation error, ˆ βi
t − βi
t, depends linearly on the perturbations i
τ




























The sample covariances in the last expression are linear in the perturbations
[i
τ]j. It follows that the estimation error ˆ βi
t−βi
t is linear in the perturbations
[i
τ]j.
48Linearity implies that our estimator will be unbiased asymptotically be-
cause E[i
t|pI





Also, linearity, together with the assumed asymptotic conditional time
series orthogonality of individual perturbations implies that the estimation
error ˆ βi
t − βi



























for all k (k = 1,...,J).
The Impact of Estimation Error in Risk Tolerances
To demonstrate that the errors in estimating risk tolerances have no eﬀect
on ΞI asymptotically, ﬁrst consider the leading factor in the deﬁnition of ΞI,
namely, (BI

















by the law of large numbers, so estimation error in the leading factor can be
ignored asymptotically.
Ignoring the leading factor, consider next the second term in the for-
mula for ΞI. (The argument for the third term is analogous and will not be
























































































Consider the deviations of portfolio choices from the grand mean in the sec-
ond term of the last expression, zi
t − mI, i = 1,...,I. These depend linearly
on the perturbations i
t, i = 1,...,I. In the same term, the estimation errors,
namely, ˆ βi
t − βi
t and ˆ βν
t − βν
t are asymptotically are mean zero. They are
also asymptotically uncorrelated with the perturbations i
t, because they de-
pend linearly on perturbations i
τ for τ 6= t, as demonstrated earlier. Clearly,
the second term in the above expression is simply the sample covariance of
linear transformations of perturbations i
τ for τ 6= t, on the one hand, and
linear transformations of the perturbations i
t, on the other hand. Asymp-
totically, this sample covariance converges to zero in expectation. Because
perturbations i
τ and i
t are assumed independent across i, the law of large
numbers implies that the sample covariance will converge to its expectation.
Consequently, the second term in the above expression is zero asymptotically.
This leaves us only with the ﬁrst term in curly brackets. The random be-
havior of the ﬁrst term obviously does not depend on errors in the estimation
of the risk tolerances. We have the desired result: asymptotically, estimation
errors have no impact on ΞI.
Consistency of ΞI
Because their estimation errors have no eﬀect asymptotically, we can write
ΞI as a function of the true risk tolerances. This is what we did in (17).
Convergence to W I, and hence, A, is immediate.
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